GRE作文备考的相关资料
法律类
1公正的公理
Mot of the maxim of jutice current in the world, and commonly appealed to in it tranaction, are imply intrumental to carrying into effect the principle of jutice which we have now poken of. That a peron i only reponible for what he ha done voluntarily, or could voluntarily have avoided; that it i unjut to condemn any peron unheard; that the punihment ought to be proportioned to the offence, and the like, are maxim intended to prevent the jut principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that jutification. The greater part of thee common maxim have come into ue from the practice of court of jutice, which have been naturally led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than wa likely to ugget itelf to other, of the rule neceary to enable them to fulfill their double function, of inflicting punihment when due, and of awarding to each peron hi right.
2公正是道德的要求
It appear from what ha been aid, that jutice i a name for certain moral requirement, which, regarded collectively, tand higher in the cale of ocial utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any other, though particular cae may occur in which ome other ocial duty i o important, a to overrule any one of the general maxim of jutice. Thu, to ave a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to teal, or take by force, the neceary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In uch cae, a we do not call anything jutice which i not a virtue, we uually ay, not that jutice mut give way to ome other moral principle, but that what i jut in ordinary cae i, by reaon of that other principle, not jut in the particular cae. By thi ueful accommodation of language, the character of indefeaibility attributed to jutice i kept up, and we are aved from the neceity of maintaining that there can be laudable injutice.[由Www.haozuowen.com整理]
3 公正是首要司法道德
That firt of judicial virtue, impartiality, i an obligation of jutice, partly for the reaon lat mentioned; a being a neceary condition of the fulfillment of the other obligation of jutice. But thi i not the only ource of the exalted rank, among human obligation, of thoe maxim of equality and impartiality, which, both in popular etimation and in that of the mot enlightened, are included among the precept of jutice. In one point of view, they may be conidered a corollarie from the principle already lay down. If it i a duty to do to each according to hi deert, returning good for good a well a repreing evil by evil, it necearily follow that we hould treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbid) who have deerved equally well of u, and that ociety hould treat all equally well who have deerved equally well of it, that i, who have deerved equally well abolutely. Thi i the highet abtract tandard of ocial and ditributive jutice; toward which all intitution, and the effort of all virtuou citizen, hould be made in the utmot poible degree to converge. But thi great moral duty ret upon a till deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the firt principle of moral, and not a mere logical corollary from econdary or derivative doctrine. It i involved in the very meaning of utility, or the Greatet Happine Principle. That principle i a mere form of word without rational ignification, unle one peron? happine, uppoed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), i counted for exactly a much a another?. Thoe condition being upplied, Bentham? dictum, “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”, might be written under the principle of utility a an explanatory commentary.